

# EXTERIOR: Using A Dual-VM Based External Shell for Guest-OS Introspection, Configuration, and Recovery

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# Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 Our Approach
- 3 Evaluations
- 4 Conclusion

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# Virtualization

Windows XP



••

Linux




Win-7



**Virtualization Layer**


**Hardware Layer**

# Virtualization



Virtualization (i.e., hypervisor) [Popek and Goldberg, 1974] has pushed our computing paradigm from **multi-tasking** to **multi-OS**.

# Virtualization




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Consolidation, Migration, Isolation ...


# Execution Mode

Linux




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





# Execution Mode



# Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) [Garfinkel et al, NDSS'03]




# Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) [Garfinkel et al, NDSS'03]



Using a **trusted, dedicated** virtualization layer program to **monitor** the running VMs


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Using a **trusted, dedicated** virtualization layer program to **monitor** the running VMs

- Intrusion Detection
- Malware Analysis
- Memory Forensics


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# Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)




Using a **trusted**, **dedicated** virtualization layer program to **monitor** the running VMs

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## EXTERIOR

- **Execute** trusted utilities in SVM for **t**imely Guest-OS **i**ntrospection, (re)configuration and **r**ecovery.

# The Semantic Gap in VMI ([Chen and Noble HotOS'01])




- View exposed by Virtual Machine Monitor is at low-level
- There is no abstraction and no APIs
- Need to reconstruct the guest-OS abstraction


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
# Using a Dual-VM Architecture



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


**Secure VM (SVM)**




**Guest VM (GVM)**

# Using a Dual-VM Architecture




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
Guest VM (GVM)

- Virtual Machine Introspection
- Virtual Machine Configuration
- Intrusion Detection, Prevention (Recovery)

# Advantages



Secure VM (SVM)



Guest VM (GVM)


- **Isolation** (SVM and GVM are isolated)
- **Trustworthiness** (trust code is running in secure VM)
- **Automation** (no need to develop introspection utilities)
- **Security** (enabling malware analysis, forensics...)
- **Transparency** (programmers write native program in SVM)

# Observation


```
1 execve("/sbin/sysctl", ["sysctl", "-w", "kernel..=1"], ...) = 0
2 brk(0) = 0x604000
3 access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT
4 mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|.., -1, 0) = 0x7f07b1749000
5 access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R_OK) = -1 ENOENT
6 open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 3
...
47 open("/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space", O_WRONLY|...) = 3
48 fstat(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
49 mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|.., -1, 0) = 0x7f07b1748000
50 write(3, "1\n", 2) = 2
51 close(3) = 0
...
57 exit_group(0) = ?
```

Syscall trace of running `sysctl -w` to turn on the address space randomization in Linux kernel 2.6.32

# Architecture Overview of EXTERIOR




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
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# The algorithms



Secure VM (SVM)

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## The Algorithm


```

1: DynamicBinaryInstrumentation(i):
2:   if SysCallExecContext(s):
3:     if SysCallRedirectable(s):
4:       RedirectableDataTracking(i);
5:       for  $\alpha$  in MemoryAddress(i):
6:         if DataRead( $\alpha$ ):
7:            $PA(\alpha) \leftarrow V2P(\alpha)$ 
8:           Load( $PA(\alpha)$ )
9:         else:
10:          if Configuration:
11:            Store( $PA(\alpha)$ )
12:          else: //Introspection
13:            COW-Store( $PA(\alpha)$ )

```



# Mapping the GVM Memory Address






# Effectiveness

Category	Utility	Effective?	
		Syntactics	Semantics
Introspection	ps (1)	X	✓
	pstree (1)	X	✓
	lsmod (8)	✓	✓
	dmesg (1)	✓	✓
	vmstat (8)	X	✓
	netstat (8)	✓	✓
	lsof (8)	X	✓
	uptime (1)	X	✓
	df (1)	X	✓
Configuration	sysctl (8)	✓	✓
	route (8)	✓	✓
	hostname (1)	✓	✓
	chrt (1)	✓	✓
	renice (1)	✓	✓
Recovery	kill (1)	✓	✓
	rmmod (8)	✓	✓

# Performance Overhead



# Recovery

Rootkit	Targeted Function Pointer	Succeed?
adore-2.6	kernel global, heap object	✗
hookswrite	IDT table	✓
int3backdoor	IDT table	✓
kbdv3	syscall table	✓
kbeast-v1	syscall table, tcp4_seq_show	✓
mood-nt-2.3	syscall table	✓
override	syscall table	✓
phalanx-b6	syscall table, tcp4_seq_show	✓
rkit-1.01	syscall table	✓
rial	syscall table	✓
suckit-2	IDT table	✓
synapsys-0.4	syscall table	✓

# OS-Agnostic Testing

Linux Distribution	Kernel Version	Release Date	Transparent?
Debian 4.0	2.6.26	2007-04-06	✓
Debian 5.0	2.6.28	2009-02-12	✓
Debian 6.0	2.6.32	2010-01-22	✓
Fedora-8	2.6.23	2007-11-08	✓
Fedora-10	2.6.27	2008-11-25	✓
Fedora-12	2.6.31	2009-11-17	✓
Fedora-14	2.6.35	2010-11-02	✓
Fedora-16	3.1.0	2011-11-08	✓
OpenSUSE-10.3	2.6.22	2007-10-04	✓
OpenSUSE-11.0	2.6.25	2008-06-19	✓
OpenSUSE-11.1	2.6.27	2008-12-18	✓
OpenSUSE-11.2	2.6.31	2009-11-12	✓
OpenSUSE-11.3	2.6.34	2010-07-15	✓
OpenSUSE-12.1	3.1.0	2011-11-16	✓
Ubuntu-8.04	2.6.24	2008-04-24	✓
Ubuntu-8.10	2.6.27	2008-10-30	✓
Ubuntu-9.04	2.6.28	2009-04-23	✓
Ubuntu-9.10	2.6.31	2009-10-29	✓
Ubuntu-10.04	2.6.32	2010-04-29	✓
Ubuntu-10.10	2.6.35	2010-10-10	✓
Ubuntu-11.04	2.6.38	2011-04-28	✓
Ubuntu-11.10	3.0.4	2011-10-13	✓

# Limitations and Future Work

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- Can handle kernel ASLR
- Need an identical trusted kernel
- Need to stop the guest VM

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## Future Work

- Derandomize the kernel address space
- Port to Windows OS





# Conclusion

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- It can be used for (automatic) introspection, (re)configuration of the guest-OS state (in the cloud), and can perform a timely response such as recovery from a kernel malware intrusion.


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- EXTERIOR has demonstrated a new program execution model on top of virtualization.


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- EXTERIOR has demonstrated a new program execution model on top of virtualization.
- (We believe) It will open new opportunities for system administration and security.

# Thank you !




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


Guest VM (GVM)

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Contact us via.  [{yangchun.fu,zhiqiang.lin}@utdallas.edu](mailto:{yangchun.fu,zhiqiang.lin}@utdallas.edu)  for any questions